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PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR VISUAL DATA AGAINST DEEP LEARNING BASED
COMPUTER VISION MODELS

by

JISHEN YANG

Under the Direction of Zhipeng Cai, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, we investigate the privacy protection schemes for the visual data
against deep-learning-based computer vision models. The image classification models based
on neural networks recently have outperformed most of the traditional models. However, as
a side-effect of the escalation of efficiency, the malicious utilization of artificial intelligence
models facilitates the leak of sensitive information from private data. In this dissertation, we
propose a series of mechanisms to protect the privacy and sensitive information contained
in visual data. The privacy protection algorithms perform information encryption on raw
image data with a trivial sacrifice in image quality to human observers. To begin with, we
propose an information encryption model for general image data and state-of-the-art image
classification models [1] [2]. The proposed novel privacy protection model, Pivot Pixel Noise
Generator (PPNG) with Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [3], generates noises on a small
portion of locations on the original image to provide privacy protection by preventing the

target machine-learning-powered computer vision models from interpreting the data into the
true label category. Furthermore, we propose a privacy protection model for a more specific
use for face image data. To protect the privacy of identity information in image data, we
propose a Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding (SMNA) model based on generative adversarial
networks (GAN) [4] to provide privacy protection on face photos against the malicious use
of the face recognition models. We finally propose an identity privacy protection model
for face data, FaceAdvGAN, with better effectiveness and higher efficiency. We utilize a
dataset of adversarial examples [5, 6] to train a more advanced model for industry use. The
generator of FaceAdvGAN learns how to transform a data sample from the distribution of
real face images to its corresponding point in the distribution of adversarial examples. The
FaceAdvGAN can generate noises only based on the knowledge of the image to be protected.
The generated noises have similar effectiveness with the normal adversarial examples and
thus can provide effective and efficient protection against state-of-the-art face recognition
models.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

With the growing amount of data generated and collected every second and the continuously upgrading computation power we enter a new era of data. The data amount
and computation power boost facilitates the development of researches on machine learning
artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. The advancing automatic information processing technologies innovate various applications which help the companies to save labor costs, assist
the government to enhance public safety, and even change people’s everyday life. However,
privacy leakage is always a inevitable side-effect of the conveniences the data and advanced
models brought to the users. Data leakage is a huge problem itself along; 55% of iOS applications and 59.7% of Android applications surreptitiously leak user’s data, according to
the statistics from [7]. Additionally, the machine learning driven AI models make the information contained in the leaked data to be instantaneously extracted and analyzed which
never happened before the advancement of the AI industry. This fact inspires us to conduct
the research to ensure the sensitive information in the data not to be leaked to the machine
learning models of malicious purposes.
We first propose to develop a general information protection model for image data
against machine-learning-based computer vision models in Chapter 3. The proposed image
privacy protection model works on users’ image data and hides the information from large
scale image classification models. Then, we propose to develop a privacy protection strategy
designed especially for the identity information in face images against certain target face
recognition models in Chapter 4. The identity privacy protection model generates noises on
users’ face images and impedes the target face recognition models to reveal the users’ identities. Although the proposed model is effective and efficient with high protection rate and
real-time speed, the limitation of the target face recognition model requires a preparation
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stage for the proposed model before use. Finally, we propose FaceAdvGAN, a highly transferable and generalized identity privacy protection model, working on face images against
general face recognition models in Chapter 5. The proposed FaceAdvGAN model works on
users’ face image data, and the protection is not exclusive to target face recognition model.
The proposed model utilizes an adversarial example dataset generated by state-of-arts generalization methods to achieve a high transferability, which ensures the protected face images
are protected across different face recognition models, and thus more suitable and convenient
for industrial use. The lite version of FaceAdvGAN model runs fast in real-time speed and
in a complete black-box manner, while the protection rate is maintained the same or even
higher.

1.1

Image Privacy Protection by Particle Swarm Optimization based Pivot
Pixel Modification
The image classification models based on neural networks recently have outperformed

most of the traditional models, and rapidly have been developed and implemented by industry because of the capability of qualifying almost any computer vision tasks. Hence, the
exposure of users’ image data to unauthorized powerful models causes more information leak
in a shorter time. Through experiments, we find that for one input image, the sensitivity of
the change of image classification model prediction scores to each pixels’ RGB value change
is different and the pattern of the sensitivity on each pixel is highly related to the category and composition of the input image. By utilizing this feature, we present Pivot Pixel
Noise Generator by Particle Swarm Optimization to generate noise points on original images
to lower the target model’s accuracy of correctly predicting the target image’s label, so to
protect the information contained in the target image from the image classification models.
The model performs in a half-black-box manner and balances the number of queries to the
target and total number of modified points. We also propose an initialization strategy for
the model, PSO Knowledge Transfer, which initializes the model’s parameters with experience learned from previous runs to further reduce the number of query times and noise
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points. The model is evaluated using the image classification benchmark model ResN et50
and shows an advantage compared to the baseline algorithm.

1.2

Noise Generation GAN Based Identity Privacy Protection for Smart City
The development of infrastructure of Internet of Things (IoT) in the city leads to the

emergence of the concept of smart city which is an integrated solution to provide convenience
for various applications in our daily life by understanding and analyzing the collected data
from multi-sources. However, the expansion of face images collected from IoT devices like
surveillance cameras, wearable/mobile devices intensifies the threat of identity privacy leakage. The face recognition models further increase the risk of identity information leakage. As
a consequence, people’s personal identity information contained in the visual data collected
by the IoT devices and stored in the databases for smart city applications can be inferred
by using face recognition models. People’s identity confidentiality can be jeopardized in the
normal everyday life with the excessive utilization of the visual data collector and face recognition services. To protect the privacy of identity information in image data, we propose
a Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding model based on generative adversarial networks to provide
privacy protection on face photos against the malicious use of the face recognition models.
The model operates in the complete black-box manner without requiring any information of
the architecture or the parameters of the target model and runs in a real-time speed. The
protection can be deployed for both local images and streaming videos. The data privacy
protection is based on our proposed concept of the Sensitivity Maps, which summarizes the
effectiveness and efficiency of adding noises on each pixel on the original image to interfere
with the target model’s performance. We build a new dataset of face photos of 102 celebrities
for the proposed model to be trained and evaluated. The results of the experiment show
an advantage of protecting the identity information in face photos. The protection of face
images against the famous face recognition model FaceNet [8] increases the face embedding
distance by 15% on average.
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1.3

FaceAdvGAN: Adversarial Example Based Identity Privacy Protection
Model
Based on the Noise Generation GAN Based Identity Privacy Protection, we propose our

final work to further improve the performance and effectiveness of identity privacy protection
model. We propose to use the idea of adversarial example [9] to form up the noise mask on
the original image. However, many traditional and original adversarial example generation
methods are developed in a white-box setting, which has the shortage of strict requirements
of the knowledge of the target model’s structure and parameters. Also, some of the black-box
adversarial example generation methods utilize surrogate models to avoid the prerequisites,
but the generation process needs iterative computations with the surrogate models which are
in most time as complicated structured as the target model, and thus the adversarial example
production is very time-costing. Due to the limitation of the existing adversarial example
generation methods, and also especially for the realistic demand of identity information
privacy protection, we propose FaceAdvGAN, a GAN-based adversarial example generator
for face recognition models. FaceAdvGAN is trained on a dataset of adversarial examples
and learns the process of transformation of original images to their corresponding adversarial
examples. Finally, we propose the overall identity information privacy protection model
FaceAdvGAN that is able to generate noises on original images in a real-time speed and
black-box manner, regardless of the selection of target model.

1.4

Proposed Dissertation Organization
In this dissertation report, we investigate how to efficiently provide protection to infor-

mation in image data. In chapter 2, we review the related work of our topic. In chapter 3, we
propose an image privacy protection optimized by particle swarm optimization for general
images and image classification models. In chapter 4, we propose a GAN based identity
information protection model for face images and face recognition models. In chapter 5, we
propose our final work to improve the performance and effectiveness of the proposed identity
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information protection model for completing the dissertation. In chapter 6, we conclude and
discuss the works included in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

In this chapter, we provide the background information of our topic. We review the
literature in the fields of deep learning, computer vision, and adversarial example attacks on
deep learning models in the subsections respectively.

2.1

Deep Learning
Deep learning is a category of artificial intelligence (AI) function that based on a ma-

chine learning scheme called artificial neural networks (ANN). ANNs are computer-powered
computing systems and the design is partly inspired by the biological neural networks that
constitute animal and human brains. An ANN is structured by a collection of connected
units or nodes called artificial neurons, and the artificial neurons simulate the working of
the neurons in a biological brain. The connections between the artificial neurons describe
the relationship of signal transition to other neurons, like the synapses in a biological brain.
ANNs can imitate the workings of the human brain in processing data and creating patterns.
In a normal design, neurons are aggregated into layers. Data or signals come first into the
input layer which is usually the first layer of the model. After the first layer, the signals pass
through the middle layers, which are also referred as the hidden layers, and finally to the
last layer, which is also called the output layer. The original data or signals are taken as the
input, and by the processing of the ANN models, the input is transformed into the output
for further use in decision making or feature representation. The deep learning models are
the ANNs that utilize the structure containing multiple hidden layers and deep networks.
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2.2

Computer Vision
In 2012, Krizhevsky et al [10] introduced Alexnet to the one of the most important

benchmark competitions in the field of computer vision, ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge. Alexnet is a deep learning model which utilizes the idea of convolutional
neural network (CNN). The CNN-based model Alexnet achieves the highest performance of
accuracy ever in the history in the task of image classification. The success motivates the
development of deep CNN models. Since then, the researches of CNN models in applications of computer vision have drawn heavy attention. Later, ZFNet/Clarifai is proposed in
2013 [11], Network in Network (NiN) [12], Visual Geometry Group Network (VGGNet) in
2014 [13], GoogLeNet in 2014 [14], Residual Network (ResNet), Fast Convolutional RNN
(RCNN) [15] in 2015 [16], and Densely Connected Network (DenseNet) [17] in 2017 for image classification problems. The achievements of CNN-based models in image classification
tasks immensely assist the information extraction and analysis in image data. Thus, the privacy loss of leakage of sensitive images is escalated by the improved performance of artificial
intelligent computer vision models.

2.3

Adversarial Example Attack
Despite the advancement in performance of deep learning convolutional network

(DCNN) based applications, many DCNN-drived visual networks can be very vulnerable
to test images with elaborately generated imperceptible noises [9]. This type of the modified
data samples is called adversarial examples. Adversarial examples attacks can be classified
as into mainly 3 categories, white-box attacks, half-black-box attacks, and black-box attacks.
White-box attacks need the target DCNN model to be fully accessible for the attacker. The
attacker holds all the information about the target DCNN model including the network’s architectures, model parameters, and even training databases. Also, in the white-box setting,
the attacker can make queries to the target model without any limitations. Half-black-box
attacks assume that the attacker can only obtain the output of the model. Besides the query
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feedback, the attacker has no more information about the target model. Black-box attacks
assume that the attacker has strictly neither access nor information to and about the target
model.
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Chapter 3

IMAGE PRIVACY PROTECTION BY PARTICLE SWARM
OPTIMIZATION BASED PIVOT PIXEL MODIFICATION

In this chapter, we study the issue of the strategies for privacy leakage from image data
and propose an information encryption model based on the idea of pivot pixel and PSO
algorithm.

3.1

Motivation
Deep learning models have been significantly developed in recent years. The robust

performance of deep learning models inspired various applications in various industrial fields.
Besides the escalation of efficiency, artificial intelligence models require a large amount of
data to be trained and how to reserve privacy in deep learning becomes a severe issue. The
main contributors to data booming, including social networks and Internet of Things (IoT),
usually contain users’ sensitive private information. While, existing approaches that aim
to protect privacy of big data are either to apply privacy protection on the original user
data [18,19], on the way of data being transferred [20–23], or at the stage of data being used
by deep learning networks [24, 25].
In the field of computer vision, deep learning neural networks developed dramatically
since 2012. Alexnet [1] was introduced to the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge, which is one of the most important benchmarks in computer vision. Alexnet utilized
the idea of convolutional neural network and achieved the highest performance of accuracy
in the task of image classification and motivates a number of related researches. Indeed, the
image classification models facilitate the work of visual data analysis, but the potential of
undesired use of image classification models increases the risk of information leaking. Once
the private pictures are exposed to those image classification models, the automatic algo-
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rithms can add labels to the visual data in a concise time period with high accuracy. Then
the malicious party could extract more sensitive information from the understanding of the
visual data. With the increase of IoT sensors and publicly accessible cameras, visual data
becomes one of the new leading sources of privacy loss [26]. For example, if personal photos
are leaked to a malicious party, the party could further understand the personal information
contained in the photos, as location information from a photo with a landmark building,
financial information from a photo of a valued car, demographic information like gender and
age from a selfie, and even personality and consumer preferences with more sophisticated
analysis. Or, if pictures of business files are leaked, the loss could be more direct and critical. Since all the extraction of features from the image are automatic with high speed and
information clips from each individual image could be integrated in a timely manner, the
data leak could cause significant further cost. In this way, to better protect the confidential
content of visual data even compromised to unauthorized access, an effective information
encryption model for artificial intelligence models is necessary. Also, with the development
of research on machine learning, some popular cloud service providers, such as Amazon [27],
Google [28], and Microsoft [29], offer a machine learning service solution: Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS). The MLaaS platforms set up machine learning environments and
computation resources. And the training dataset can include private information. Song et
al. [30] found that even the malicious party only has access to the parameters of the machine
learning model, they still can infer information of the training set.
To preserve privacy and information security, the raw image data either stored locally
or on the cloud needs protection from convolutional neural networks. Although the convolutional neural networks achieved much progress in computer vision, the model structure is
vulnerable to small changes in value at critical locations on the original input image data,
and the output of the networks can be strongly influenced by even minor perturbations.
In 2019, Su et al. [31] proposed a novel adversarial example generating model to conduct
attacks on convolutional neural networks by changing only several or even just one pixel’s
RGB value in an input image. The attack model is named One Pixel Attack and demon-
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strates impressive performance by adding noise on one pixel level to original input image
data to interference the prediction of target classification neural network. The attack is in a
half-black-box manner. The target model’s structure and parameters are not accessible, and
the attack model has unlimited opportunities of attempts of sending modified image to and
collecting output from target model. However, the One Pixel Attack is a more heuristic idea
than practical solution, since only on a relatively low-resolution image input setting, which is
32 by 32 pixels, the model illustrates best performance. To conduct attack on high-resolution
image, the attack needs a longer length of perturbation that is an acceptable larger number
of points where the noise is added on. Then the proposed optimization method, Deferential
Evolution, shows lack of efficiency and automaticity because the new attempts of where to
add the noise are pure randomly selected, and the number of attacked points is determined
by manually set hyper-parameters.
Thus, we propose a novel noise generation model to prevent malicious machine learning
powered computer vision models gaining too much information from users’ image data, with
the concept of adversarial example attack. Our data protection model Pivot Pixel Noise
Generator (PPNG), with Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [3] provides protection to image data with noises on a small number of pixels on high-resolution image from classification
neural networks. The model utilizes PSO Knowledge Transfer, an initialization strategy of
PSO parameters with the experiences from previous target images. Also, the model can
automatically self-adapt the number of points to be modified, ensuring the success of protection. In other words, the model can perform pixel-level attack with vastly reduced queries
to the target image classification model, and meanwhile maintaining a tolerable trade-off of
a modestly increased number of affected pixels.
The main contributions of this work are highlighted as follows:
• We achieve privacy protection on image data from image classification neural networks
by reducing the prediction accuracy with a proposed complete half-black-box privacy
protection model, Pivot Pixel Noise Generator, which balances the trade-off of running
time and number of pixels modified.
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• We define the sensitivity map of images to image classification neural networks. Each
input image has a sensitivity map which potentiates the protection strategy of locating
and modifying critical points to alter classification results without knowledge of target
model’s architecture and parameters. Through the features of sensitivity maps, we
propose to utilize PSO to optimize our model.
• We introduce a novel strategy of PSO parameters initialization, Knowledge Transfer.
On each time of noise-generation on target images, the model keeps the experience of
PSO parameters for future uses, which significantly reduces the running time and the
number of queries to the target model, and hence facilitates the processing of protection
on a large amount of image data.

3.2

Related Works
The research on adversarial example attack in image classification neural network models

has been studied for years. In 2014, Szegedy et al. [5] discovered that many state-of-theart neural networks are sensitive to adversarial examples. The term adversarial examples
are the examples images based on original example images with only slightly perturbations
which are hardly perceivable by human observers but cause the neural network models to
misclassify the example to wrong categories. In 2015, Nguyen et al. [32] introduced a novel
approach to generate images to fool the deep learning classifiers. The evolutionary algorithm
generated images are not recognizable by human, and the target neural networks misclassify
the images to wrong categories with very high confidence. This work reveals that deep
learning models are very vulnerable to intentionally built adversarial examples. However,
the method is not to protect existing image data. Papernot et al. [33] in their 2016 work
discussed the relationship of attack difficulty and information known about the target model.
The paper introduces a concept of Saliency Map, which summarizes the performance change
of the target model to the location where the noise is added but computed with information
of the target model’s architecture and weight parameters.
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Papernot et al. [34] in 2017 introduced a new idea of performing an adversarial example
attack in a black-box manner. They managed to build a substitute model in order to overpass
the need to acquire the target model’s parameter and architecture. The work is tested on
MNIST [35] and GTSRD [36] dataset, which relatively lower resolution level. When the
input images have a larger size, and the target model has more complicated architecture, the
cost of training the attack model increases rapidly. Su et al. [31] developed their adversarial
example attack model in a more extreme setting that the adversarial example is only one
pixel different from the normal example in value. However, the model only uses Differential
Evolution as the optimizer, and hence the attack model does not sufficiently utilize the
information of previous attack attempts. Also, the model illustrates a lower attack successful
rate on ImageN et dataset than Cif ar10 [37], which indicates that for examples of more
pixels, noise with a length of only one pixel is not enough.
Zhang et al. [38] developed an adversarial example attack model based on PSO, and the
setting of the particles is the same size of the target image. The optimization goal is to alter
the predicted label with a limitation of L2 distance between the modified target image and
the original image. Similarly, Mosli et al. [39] show their attack model based on PSO, with
each particle initialized as a target image with randomized noise added on. Further, they
proposed a procedure to reduce excess perturbations when the attack is already successful in
avoiding the adversarial examples that differ too much from the original examples. However,
these applications of PSO ignore previous experiences.

3.3

System Model
The generation of the protective noises on original images can be formalized as an

optimization problem. The optimization goal is to minimize the output classification score
of the correct label while maintaining a minimum number of pixels affected. The PPNG
model is consisted by 3 components, including Point Value (find the sensitivity of a certain
pixel), PSO Update (find the pivot pixel on current stage of protection), and Pivot Pixel
Noise Generator (add noise on the pivot pixel that PSO has found).
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3.3.1

Model Architecture

In our settings, the pixel noise generator is the function to be optimized. The pixel
noise generator works in the way that the input is the location of the pixel to add noise
on, and the output is the new prediction score of the modified image by the target image
classification model. To maximize the performance of the privacy protection model, we use
PSO to optimize the function, i.e., to find the best position of the pixel to add noise on,
which ensures the target model returns global minimum output classification score for the
correct class with only one pixel’s RGB value been changed. For this point, each particle
has two dimensions, which represent the location of the pixel to be modified in the original
input image to find the most influential pixel on the current image, and we defined as the
pivot pixel.
PSO is an optimizer that fits well for the setting. It is free from requiring the full
computation details from the target model and is powerful for finding the global and local
minimum of a function. PSO works with a population of candidate solutions, in another
term, the swarm of particles. Each particle is a candidate solution in the searching space,
which has the same dimension of an input to the function to be optimized. The particles
move with speed and direction based on each particle’s own known best position and globalbest-known position of the entire swarm. After each iteration, the best-known positions of
each particle and the entire swarm are updated by queries to the target function, and the
current position of the particle is updated by calculated movement speed and direction.
However, the raw images taken into the target model have a size of 224 by 224 pixels,
which is 49 times more than images of 32 by 32 pixels in Cif ar10 dataset. Only changing
one single pixel’s value is not enough to affect the classification scores by enough amount to
alter the top 1 predicted class. To further improve the protection performance, more pixels
need to be modified, and to continue implementing the modification on more pivot pixels,
we define a new term round which means that for each round the pixel noise generator is
going to modify one pivot pixel whose position found by PSO after T iterations. By the end
of each round, the pixel level of noise is added to the global-best point, which is supposed to
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be the pivot point found by PSO. Then, the next round of optimization will be conducted
on the newly modified image. The most notable innovation of the optimization is that
between each round, all of the temporary parameters learned from previous round can be
used for the new round of searching the pivot point on the new state of the image. Since the
gradient maps of the target image with p points modified and that with p +1 points modified
have similar patterns, the experiences of PSO learned from previous rounds are fit for the
new round. Under this framework, the number of queries to the target model is significantly
dropped, and the privacy protection model can perform faster with the noise adding position
still near pivot point in a desirable trade-off. If the protection is successful in R rounds of
optimization, it means that the privacy protection model is able to alter the classification
result to incorrect labels by modifying R pixels on the original image. Furthermore, the
Knowledge Transfer of PSO works not only on the consecutive rounds of optimization on
the same image but also on a new image in the same category.
In the PPNG model, the feasibility of the utilization of optimizer by PSO and Knowledge
Transfer of PSO is based on three assumptions.
The first assumption is that the sensitivity map of a target image has gradients and
suitable for PSO to find global maximum point. The sensitivity of a pixel is the decrease of
the output confidence score of the corresponding correct label of image classification models
with the image if the pixel is modified with noise. The sensitivity map of an image is a map
with the same size as the original image, and the value of each pixel is the pixel’s sensitivity.
The second assumption is that the sensitivity maps of two images different from one pixel,
or in other words, two images from two consecutive rounds are similar in pattern. The third
assumption is that the sensitivity maps of two different images from the same category or
similar composition are similar in pattern.
To test and verify the feasibility of our model, we conducted the experiments to validate
our assumptions. The target model is ResN et50 trained with ImageN et dataset [40], and
the input images are exclusive from the training dataset. The experiment is to add noise on
every single pixel independently from the rest of all pixels and send each of the modified new
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Figure 3.1. Assumption Illustration
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images to the target model to get predict results. Then, we assign each pixel’s sensitivity
as the amount of decrease in the classification score of the correct class label from collected
results. Finally, we build the sensitivity map of each test image for different target models.
In Figure 3.1, (a) is the original input image elephant1, and (b) is the sensitivity map
of the original image to target model ResN et50 [2]. (c) is the sensitivity map of the image
modified with one pixel from the original image. (d) is the sensitivity map of another image
elephant2 in the same class. In (b) of Fig. 3.1., the sensitivity map clearly shows that PSO
is suitable for the function because the function values change smoothly without very sharp
outliers. Further, we obtain and compare the sensitivity maps of the same image with only
one pixel in difference. As the results show in (c), the similarity in pattern ensures that our
setting of inheriting PSO parameters from previous rounds is valid. Last, in (d) of Fig. 3.1.,
the sensitivity maps of two images with analogous structure help the assumption 3 stand.
3.3.2

Problem Description

The optimization of generating adversarial example of images is to maximize the decrease in prediction accuracy of target image classification model which under constraints.
We formalize the input image as a vector x with length or dimensions as n, and each of
the elements is one pixel. The target model noted as f , which takes input of n-dimensional
vector x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ), and output a classification label and score, L and fL (x). fL (x)
also represents the probability of x falling into the class L. We define the noise vector, which
is to be added on the original input vector x as vector e(x). In our case, we aim to maximize
the decrease of fL (x0 ) and x0 = x + e(x), while minimize the length of e(x).

maximizefnotL (x + e(x))

(3.1)

minimize||e(x)||

(3.2)
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3.3.3

Model Components

The formal algorithm shows below. For the Algorithm 1: Point Value, the input P is
a list with a length of 2, representing the coordinates on axles. f is the image classification
model that the protection model is aiming to duel against. The input image x with correct
label L is the target image. The return value of model f with input x is presented as f (x),
which is a list of scores for different predicted categories, and fL (x) is the confidence level of
x fall in the correct category L. In other terms, this algorithm is to add noise on the point
P and returns the decrease of fL (x).
Algorithm 1: Point Value.
Input: P , x, L, and f .
xmodif ied ← x + Noise at Point P ;
P ointV alue ← fL (x) − fL (xmodif ied );
Return P ointV alue
For the Algorithm 2 : PSO Update Particle Positions, this is a PSO optimizer application in setting of each particle with dimension of 2, and the value of a particle position
is calculated by Algorithm 1. We set the PSO with a total of n particle in the swarm and
initialization of start positions G and velocities V of particles uses knowledge transfer from
selected images of a similar pattern. pbest represents each particles’ history position of best
value, and gbest is the position of best value of the whole swarm. ks are the multiplier constants for calculating accelerations of velocity for positions of particles in the next iteration,
where k1 is for the part of acceleration based on each particle’s own experience, and k2 is for
that based on the experience of the society of swarm.
Algorithm 3: Pivot Pixel Noise Generator by PSO is our integrated model. For each
round, PSO repeats to optimize the function and find the pivot point of best protection
performance. If the output score of correct class from target model with modified image is
still the highest among scores of all classes, which means the protection is not yet successful,
and for continuous T iterations, the decrease of output score of correct class is minor than
a threshold h, the algorithm moves to a new round. The hyper-parameter h and T balance
the accuracy of finding the actual pivot point and the running time of the algorithm. If h
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Algorithm 2: PSO Update Particle Positions.
Input: pbest, gbest, V , G, n, k1 , and k2 .
for i ← 0 to n do
Vi ← Vi + k1 ∗ unif orm(0, 1) ∗ (pbesti − Gi ) + k2 ∗ unif orm(0, 1) ∗ (gbest − Gi )
Gi ← Gi + Vi
CurrentP ointV alue ← P ointV alue(Gi , x)
P articleBestV alue ← P ointV alue(pbesti , x)
if CurrentP ointV alue > P articleBestV alue then
pbest ← Gi ;
end
end

is set to 0, and T set to infinity, the algorithm is always to find the actual pivot point, but
the running time compromises significantly and hence inefficient. The point on the target
image at position gbest is then modified at end of each rounds, and the target image is
replaced by the newly modified image for the next round. Between two consecutive rounds,
the parameters of PSO is inherited, including G, V , pbest and gbest. If the protection
succeeded, R is the count of pixels where all the noises are added to.
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Algorithm 3: Pivot Pixel Noise Generator by PSO.
Input: x, L, n, T , h, k1 , k2 , f , pbest, gbest, G, and V .
initialization:
R ← 0;
M odif iedImage ← x;
while M ax(f (M odif iedImage)) = fL (M odif iedImage) do
PSO Update Particle Positions
for i ← 0 to n do
P articleBestV alue ← P ointV alue(pbesti , M odif iedImage)
GlobalBestV alue ← P ointV alue(gbest, M odif iedImage)
if P articleBestV alue > GlobalBestV alue then
gbest ← pbesti ;
end
end
if GlobalBestV alue[−T ] − GlobalBestV alue[−1] < h then
M odif iedImage ← M odif iedImage + Noise at Point gbest;
R ← R+1
end
end
Return M odif iedImage, R
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Algorithm 4: Exhaustive Search.
Input: x with height H and weith W , L, and f
initialization:
T empScore ← 0;
BestScore ← 1;
BestP oint ← (0, 0);
M odif iedImage ← x;
while M ax(f (M odif iedImage)) = fL (M odif iedImage) do
for h ← 0 to H do
for w ← 0 to W do
T empImg ← M odif iedImage;
Add Noise on T empImg at (h, w);
T empScore ← fL (T empImg);
if BestScore > T empScore then
BestScore ← T empScore;
BestP oint ← (h, m);
end
end
end
Add Noise on M odif iedImage at BestP oint;
end
Return M odif iedImage
The baseline algorithm towards this problem is the exhaustive search. We design the
exhaustive search algorithm for a minimum number of modified points to alter the target
model’s classification top 1 category as in Algorithm 4. The idea of the exhaustive search
algorithm is to run a noise adding test on every point of the image to the target model, and
always modify the most influential point until the predicted category is changed.

22

Figure 3.2. PPNG Test Results on Identical Test Case

3.4

Experiments
To test our the privacy protection model, we set up simulation in the following settings.

We use ResN et50 as the target model, the image classification model to be protect from,
with parameters trained on ImageN et dataset taking input image size of 224 by 224 pixels.
In the first simulation, we select the same test picture elephant1 showing an elephant. The
target model’s original top 3 classification results of the image are ’Indian elephant’, ’tusker’,
and ’African elephant’ with confidence level of 0.954, 0.024 and 0.017 accordingly.
The test results of the baseline algorithm of exhaustive search show that by always
selecting and modifying the most influential pixel (in other words, the point which has the
highest value on the sensitivity map) on each state of noise adding process, at least 16 points
are necessary to be altered in order to change the predicted category. As shown in (a) of
Fig. 2., the new results of the modified image are top 1 category of ‘Arabian camel’ with a
probability of 0.303.
Although the protection using the exhaustive search algorithm is successful, the protection procedure takes an enormous amount of time and computation power, and most
importantly great number of queries to the target model. To decide one location of a pivot
pixel, the algorithm needs to access the target model by 224 ∗ 224 times. The target model
is called 16 ∗ 224 ∗ 224 times, and thus it is not ideally efficient.
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Then, we test PPNG model on the same image to the same target model. The hyperparameters are set as acceleration constants k1 = k2 = 0.1, particle number n = 50, score
decrease threshold h = 0.01 and iteration number T = 5. The initialization of pbest, gbest
and G as random numbers with upper bound of 223 and lower bound of 0, and V as 0s.
Then, our model can successfully conduct the protection by modifying 22 points with the
total number of iteration of PSO as 152. So, the new protection model dramatically reduces
the number of accessing to the target model to 152 ∗ 50 times. In this way, the protection
model sacrifices the number of modified pixels and save the running time and target model
queries with ensuring protection success. In Fig. 3.2, (a) is the modified image by exhaustive
search algorithm. (b) is the modified image by PPNG model. (c) is the curve of output
confidence score of the category ’Indian elephant’ by iterations. The protection results of
the model to the modified image in (b) of Fig. 3.2. are also top 1 category of ‘Arabian camel’
with a probability of 0.317. In this way, the image classification model is no more able to
correctly extract information from the target image, and thereby the privacy is preserved.
Additionally, in (c) of Fig. 3.2. the curve of the performance of the protection indicates the
strategy of setting the threshold h and iteration number T effectively saves the protection
model from over-fitting and so reduces the running time. The curve is the output confidence
score of the correct category by each time of updating with PSO. The x axle is the number
of iterations, and the y axle is the confidence score of the ground truth category. With h set
to 0.01 and T set to 5, if for five consecutive iterations, all of the particles in the swarm have
not found a better position, the pixel according to the gbest is modified with noise. The
horizon part of the ladder-shaped curve indicates that the numbers of iterations of gbest not
been updated, and the fast drop indicates that a new noise point is made. Specifically in
iteration 52 to 60, the PSO keeps updating the gbest, and from iteration 60 to 64 the gbest
remains the same value. So, after the iteration of 64, with a new noise point added to the
target image, the output score of the correct label decreased quickly, which means that PSO
is able to find the next pivot point very fast. During iteration 100 to 120, again the PSO
shows the capability of locating the pivot point on updated target image.
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Figure 3.3. PPNG Test Results on Different Test Case.

This simulation illustrates the advantage of PPNG model. The PSO can find or approach the global-best point on the sensitivity map without running a test on every pixel.
And the design of setting a threshold of optimization of each round helps the PSO to prevent
excessive updates of particle positions and queries to the target model because the difference
in the performance of the current gbest and best point of actual sensitivity map is acceptable considering the cost of computation and number of queries by continuing updating. The
efficiency of lower the accuracy of prediction of target model enables the model to provide
protection to images in a short time.
More of the simulations on other images in the same category show similar results.
Image elephant2 has original top 3 classification results of ’Indian elephant’, ’tusker’, and
’African elephant’ with a confidence level of 0.803, 0.147, and 0.047. By exhaustive search
algorithm, the image needs 11 points to be modified to change the output category. The
number of accessing the target model is 11 ∗ 224 ∗ 224. By using the PPNG model with
random initialization and the same hyper-parameters as simulation of image elephant1, the
number of noise-added points increases to 19 but only after 125 update iterations, which
makes 125 ∗ 50 queries. The modified results are in Fig. 3.3, where (a) is the adversarial
example generated by exhaustive search with 11 points modified, (b) is by PPNG model
with 19 points modified, and (c) is the curve of score of label ’Indian elephant’, all based on
image ’elephant2’.
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Figure 3.4. PPNG Test Results with Knowledge Transfers Case1.
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After the first protection conducted for images in one category, the model saves the
previous experiences for knowledge transfer of PSO for future protection initialization use
of similar images. We test the PPNG model on the same image with knowlegde from the
previous test image elephant1 on the same target model. The protection goes successful
by changing the predicted category to ‘tusker’ with a confidence level of 0.380, with not
only the number of points altered dropping to 16 but also iteration number reducing to
101. Moreover, initialization with knowledge from the same image of elephant2 on different
target image classification model V GG16 [41] also helps. With knowledge transfer, the
protection is done with top 1 predicted category of ‘tusker’ with a confidence level of 0.334.
The number of altered points keeps 19, and the number of total iterations of PSO reduces
to 116. The results in Fig. 3.4. illustrate the advantage of knowledge transfer, where (a)
and (c) are the modified image by PPNG model initialized knowledge transferred from the
protection procedure of image elephant1 on the same target model ResN et50 and knowledge
transferred from the protection procedure of image elephant2 on V GG16. (b) and (d) are
the corresponding score curves. At early stages, the PSO locates the global-best position
of particles in a faster manner on the new image, and the curve of confidence level shows
more of ladder-shaped drops in the first iterations, which indicates that the PSO finds the
global-best position more swiftly and clearly.
Similarly, we test more images with different categories. The results are shown in Fig.
3.5, where (a) and (d) are the modified results by exhaustive search, (b) and (e) are by
PPNG model, (c) and (f) are the curve of score of label ’desk’, of image ’desk1’ and ’desk2’.
The original image ’desk1’ has the classification result of ’desk’ with the confidence level of
0.962, and ’dining table’ with 0.032 and ’desktop computer’ with 0.001. By exhaustive search
algorithm, the target model gives the results of ’dining table’ with a confidence level of 0.554,
which becomes the top 1 classification category. The protected image is added by noise at
11 points, and the exhaustive search algorithm queries the target model by 11 ∗ 224 ∗ 224
times. By using the PPNG model with the same hyper-parameter setting, the queries to
target model reduce to 103 ∗ 50 times and with total 16 points modified to change the top 1
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Figure 3.5. PPNG Test Results with Knowledge Transfers Case2.

predicted category to ’dining table’ with a score of 0.500. For test image ’desk2’, the original
score is 0.938, and the baseline algorithm needs 13 points and 13∗224∗224 calls to the target
model, while PPNG model needs 24 points with 151 ∗ 50 queries. The results are shown in
Fig. 5. The reason why the PPNG model needs more points is that for these two images,
the sensitivity map is not very evident with gradients. The surroundings of the table also
show the importance of affecting the target model output results. As shown in (d) of Fig.
3.5., the baseline algorithm chooses points near the edge of the image, where the pixel shows
the largest influence on the target model performance. Also, the difference of sensitivity of
pixels is not as significant as those of images in other categories. But still, the PPNG model
managed to provide protection with substantially fewer queries to the target model.
Additionally, the protection on image ’desk2’ initialized with knowledge transferred
from protection of ’desk1’ on same target model, needs 24 points and 142 iterations. With
knowledge transferred from itself on alternative target model V GG16, PPNG needs 17 points
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with 106 iterations of update. The improvement illustrates the benefits of initialization with
knowledge than randomized numbers.

3.5

Conclusion
This chapter proposes an adversarial example privacy protection model, Pivot Pixel

Noise Generator, with the evolutionary search algorithm, Particle Swarm Optimization. The
model is to adjust values of a trivial amount of pixels and significant reduce the accuracy
of predictions of image classification neural networks, and so to protect the information
contained in the original image data. The model is based on the fact that specific points
on an original input image to classification neural networks show higher importance to final
predict results. Also, the privacy protection model can inherit experiences from protection
history of similar target images to the same target model and the same target image to other
target models. The experiments evaluations on ResN et50 trained on ImageN et dataset
show that in practical black-box settings, the privacy protection model greatly alleviates the
number of queries to the target model compared to the baseline algorithm with ensuring
the success of protection. In the future, we aim to constructing a knowledge base for PSO
of images in different categories and design a more automatic initialization strategy for the
PPNG model.
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Chapter 4

NOISE GENERATION GAN BASED IDENTITY PRIVACY PROTECTION
FOR SMART CITY

In this chapter, we extend our work to a more realistic and pragmatic model for a more
specific use. The model proposed in this chapter is specialized for the protection of identity
information contained in face photos. The proposed model utilizes a GAN-based structure
and is able to run fast in real-time to be deployed on video surveillance equipment.

4.1

Motivation
Ever since the entry of the information era, the infrastructure of the Internet of Things

(IoT) was progressively developed. In the current state, a mass amount of IoT devices with
embedded sensors are deployed at every corners of the city and creating massive streams
of real-time data. Although there are works protecting privacy in the cyber-physical applications [42], however, with the upgrading of computation power and the booming volume
of data, the researchers developed numerous advanced artificial intelligence mechanisms to
improve the efficiency of information processing. The combination of the increased power
of automatic information processing and the development of infrastructure of IoT devices in
cities leads to a high degree of integration of information technology. A concept for the comprehensive solution for understanding, managing, and interpreting the captured data by all
types of sensors in a city is introduced as Smart City [43–45]. However, with the technology
development, there are also privacy concerns [46]. Although there are some privacy protection schemes proposed, still the massive amount of uploaded data to the cloud by smart
devices every day causes privacy problems [47–49]. Based on the data, a lot of applications
and their privacy solution of smart city are proposed by the researchers in different fields such
as intelligent transportation systems [50–53], health condition monitoring systems [54–56],
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public safety and security solutions [57–59], and location-based services [60–64]. Among all
the applications, visual data is one of the most common and important data type to be
utilized [57, 65–67]. Because of the escalated efficiency of face recognition techniques based
on deep learning models with the high performance and the stability [8, 68–70], the facial
images captured by multi-camera video surveillance system and the mobile smart devices
can make significant improvements in these applications [71] including human tracking and
sensing [72], health monitoring, face payment, and public safety monitoring, etc. Many
deep learning model based face recognition techniques are openly accessible for personal and
business uses with a modest cost from the providers such as Microsoft [29], Amazon [27],
and Google [28]. The utilization of the models facilitates perceiving identity information of
pedestrians, drivers, and even criminals for different smart city applications.
Besides the benefits and conveniences by the use of collected visual data and the face
recognition techniques, the increment of vulnerability of privacy of identity information is
a severe drawback of the escalation of efficiency. For example, by the broad utilization of
the face recognition, the human tracking applications are able to perceive people’s daily
routine and activities, such as shopping in malls, jogging in parks, or walking to banks.
Also, the increasing online rumors [73, 74] can affect people’s lives in physical world if the
identity is revealed. The face recognition model is able to recognize a person in different
environments and keep tracking and recording the movements. If the information is leaked,
with these knowledge of a person, the scammers would be able to perform a very persuasive
and indiscernible fraud to the victim, after a last step which is to locate the victim identity.
As described in Fig. 4.1 without any protection of the original photos, the face recognition
models can easily derive the identity of a user by pairing the faces contained in the image
data with the face records from other sources like photo ID and social network. In other
words, many smart city applications collect a wide range of privacy-sensitive information
from people and their social circles [75]. In addition, the fast and convenient face recognition
techniques convert the collected high dimension image data to useful identity information,
thus increasing the risk of identity information leakage. Actually, data privacy is more likely
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to be vulnerable than it when the mass processing of information is not proficient. Once the
collected visual data is exposed to the malignant unauthorized group with face recognition
technology, peoples’ identity information is imperiled dexterously and in the most of the
time user-unconsciously because the streams of data are input to face recognition models
which extract and analyze the data automatically and almost spontaneously. Subsequently,
with the trend of development of smart city applications, the malicious utilization of artificial
intelligence models facilitates the leak of sensitive information from public data. For instance,
with the knowledge of all the employees’ face ID, the employer can track every employee’s
activities in the factory or office buildings by security cameras, even when the employee is
off-duty, whereas the workers need private time and space.
Therefore, to solve the privacy concerns and to protect the confidential content in visual
data, an effective information encryption model for visual data against artificial intelligence
models is imperative. The purpose of an visual private information protection model is to
hide the sensitive information contained in the image data from the face recognition models
but not from human observers. Thus, the procedure conducted have to alter the raw image
precisely and yield influential impact to the accuracy of face recognition models. Then, the
identity information contained in the image data is kept confidential from the computer
vision models without evident alteration.
There are several kinds of methods proposed in the field. Some works are ground
on the idea of adversarial example attack [32]. These protection algorithms works on the
human faces performs in a white box manner with the assumption that the entire target face
recognition model’s structure and parameters are known, which is not commonly possible.
Some other methods utilizes the idea of exhaustive search to find a optimal noise to the target
model with constraining the total magnitude of the alteration [76]. However, the time cost
for this type of methods is too much to deal with the live streaming visual data. The process
needs to run fast on a real-time level so the data collected by the surveillance cameras can be
processed promptly and has the capability to deal with mass amount of data. Besides, some
methods use generative adversarial networks (GAN) [4] model to generate disturbing noise.
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But the training state needs queries to the target models or substitute models [77] [78].
In an idea visual privacy protection model, the process should only work on raw image
data without accessing or querying directly to the face recognition models. Furthermore, a
good privacy protection requires as minimum as possible auxiliary information of any face
recognition models in order to be applicable for universal purposes.
In this paper, we propose a novel privacy protection model, the Sensitivity Map NoiseAdding (SMNA) model. The proposed SMNA model is able to protect the identity information contained in image data from face recognition models by adding inconspicuous noises
in real-time speed and offline setting. The overview of the protection process is illustrated
in Figure 4.1, where the identity information protection model works on the visual data
from miscellaneous sources. In Figure 4.1 is the illustration of the identity protection model
working on the face image captured. The face recognition models can infer the identity of
the captured image by comparing the photo with the ID or other photos online. After the
modification by the identity protection model, the target face recognition models should no
longer be able to obtain the identity information of the captured image and the identity
information in the original data becomes obscure to the target face recognition models. The
design of noise addition is inspired by the researches of adversarial example attack. Our
proposed method is developed based on the nature of many deep learning driven models
that the performance of the face recognition deep learning models can be intensely lowered
on the input image with only a subtle noise added that is hardly noticeable by human observers. The elaborately modified instances, here in our model are the faces, mislead the
neural network systems to misclassify the processed input data samples into classes those are
different from the ground truth labels. The SMNA model generates trivial perturbations on
the original image that precipitate the malfunction of the target face recognition deep learning models to cover the true label of the original image which is the identity information.
Consider a scenario that a hotel company equips smart face-recognition-deployed doorbells
for each guest room.
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Face Recognition Model

Figure 4.1. The llustration of the Identity Protection Model Working on Face Images.

In this way, the hotel company records every visitor’s face to every guest rooms and
discovers the visitor’s identity by comparing the recorded face with the labeled public visual
data online. Through this process just as illustrated in Figure 4.1, the hotel company can
construct the social connection between the guest and his visitors. This privacy leakage can
cause severe business loss when the guest rooms are booked by celebrities or people in high
positions. Additionally, the hotel company can even track the guests’ and visitors’ routes
and worsen the situation if they share the data with other companies. However, all the loss
caused by the privacy issue could be avoided if the camera of the digital doorbells deploy a
privacy protection system for face photo as in Figure 4.1, while all the services remaining
functional.
Our proposed SMNA model plays the role of identity protection model in Figure 4.1 and
the demonstration of the implementation of the SMNA model is shown in Figure 4.2, that
after the protection process, the original image x is no longer recognized as the same person
with the official portrait xstandard by the target face recognition model. The original image x
passes through the SMNA model and is transformed into xmodif ied with added perturbations.
Then the modified image xmodif ied fools the target face recognition model to misclassify into
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Figure 4.2. The Demonstration of the Proposed SMNA Model.

a wrong category of different person, and in this way identity information contained in the
image is avoided being unjustifiably acquired. In our design, the perturbations are produced
based on our newly introduced concept of the sensitivity of pixels. The sensitivity of a pixel
is a metric to measure how sensitive the change of the target model’s final output confidence
score is to the pixel’s RGB value adjustments. In other words, the sensitivity of a pixel
describes the influence of the pixel to the overall output results and the efficiency to add
noise on the particular pixel. The sensitivity map of an image is defined as a matrix with the
same size as it of the image, and each of its elements is the sensitivity of the corresponding
pixel at the location on the original image. By this way, the sensitivity map well represents
the importance of each pixel of the original image to the final prediction of the target model.
Also, the sensitivity maps can be visualized if turned into grey scale images as shown in
Figure 4.3 which is the process of the privacy protection of the proposed model. The input
image x is an original RGB image. During the privacy protection process, the sensitivity
map of the input image G(x) is generated. Finally, the noise is added to the original image
with the G(x) as the weights. Additionally, the visualized sensitivity maps can help us to
further understand the procedure under which the target face recognition models operate
with the original image.
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Adding noise to the original image by the weights of the image’s sensitivity map is
effective and efficient, but the calculation of sensitivity maps demands large amount of
queries to the target model and costs a lot of time. Hence, to avoid the drawbacks, we
use the structure of GAN to generate the sensitivity maps swiftly and locally without any
connections with the target model or the knowledge of structure and parameters of the
target model. The GAN structured model is able to conduct the transformation from the
original image to its sensitivity map similarly as style-changing [79]. In the system, the noise
generator runs completely offline and can work on the raw image data free from the need of
accessing the target model after and during the training. In order to sufficiently support the
training and testing for the proposed model in a realistic scene of application, we construct a
complete new dataset of faces under a specific setting that each person has a standard photo
of official portrait from the cover photo on Wikipedia or other authoritative webpages. The
dataset includes 102 celebrities and each person has 21 photos including a standard portrait
and 20 other photos for testing or training use. Besides, for the entire system including the
stage of forging the dataset, the need of knowledge of the architecture and the parameters
of the target model is avoidable. The algorithm runs on a real-time speed and consumes
acceptable computation power and thus is feasible to be deployed in miscellaneous scenarios.
The demonstration of the implementation of the SMNA model is shown in Figure 4.2.
The main contributions of this work are highlighted as follows:

Sensitivity Map 𝐺(𝑥)

Input Image

Sensitivity Map
Generator

Modiifed Image

Noise Addition

𝑥 KLMNONPM

𝑥
𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐌𝐚𝐩 𝐍𝐨𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐀𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 (𝐒𝐌𝐍𝐀)

Figure 4.3. The Process of the Privacy Protection of the Proposed SMNA Model.

36
• We propose a Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding (SMNA) model, a novel noise generating
model to protect identity information from deep learning face recognition models. The
model provides privacy protection on face image data by reducing the prediction accuracy in a complete black-box manner without requiring any information from and
queries to the target models.
• We introduce the concept of the sensitivity map to demonstrate the degree of sensitivity of pixels on original face images. The conversion of the original image and
its corresponding sensitivity map is a procedure of projection from the distribution
of RGB images to the distribution of sensitivity maps under given conditions. The
transformation is learnable by GAN models.
• We build an image dataset of faces from 102 celebrities with each celebrity’s official
portrait and 20 other images from social networks or media. The dataset can be
employed for training and testing protection strategies against different target models.

4.2

Related Work
In this section, we review the literature work that is related to the proposed work.
4.2.1

Generative Adversarial Network

In 2014, Ian Goodfellow et al. proposed a novel learning model, generative adversarial
networks (GAN) [4]. The network design enables the model to understand the training data
distribution and generate data samples with the knowledge. GAN has two components: the
generator and the discriminator. The generator is trained to fool the discriminator to misclassify generated samples as real samples, and the discriminator aims to distinguish between
the generated samples and the real samples. Many studies demonstrate the performance of
the GAN and the applications of GAN are now in diverse areas [80,81]. Later, the researchers
utilize GAN as the tool to perform black-box attacks on deep learning models. Hu et al. [82]
and Xiao et al. [83] develop the adversarial example generators based on GAN in different
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areas. In 2019 song et al. [84] build a GAN network to generate the altered face to fool the
face recognition models. The performance of the method does not reach a very high level.
4.2.2

Adversarial Example Attack

The research on the adversarial example attack to neural network models has seen much
development in recent years. The idea of an Adversarial Example Attack is to reduce the
performance of deep learning models significantly by adding noise on an input image that a
human eye can hardly noise. Szegedy et al. [5] in 2014 discovered that many neural networks
are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The term adversarial examples are the intentionally
modified data samples based on normal raw data to fool the target models. Many state-ofart neural network models misclassify these instances into wrong label categories attributed
to the imperceptible perturbations. Goodfellow et al. [85] proposed the Fast Gradient Sign
Method to generate the adversarial examples relatively fast against the target models. However, the method requires the target model’s structural information and full parameters,
which is normally inaccessible. Nguyen et al. [32] in their 2015 work introduced a novel
approach to conducting adversarial example attacks to fool the deep learning models. The
examples are not developed from the actual raw images with slight modifications. Instead,
the attack model is based on evolutionary algorithms, and the generated examples are not
understandable by a human. Nonetheless, the learning models recognize the examples and
classify bizarre images into different categories with high confidence scores. The work reveals the feasibility of misleading the deep learning models with delicately built data samples.
However, most of the adversarial example generation processes require the full knowledge of
the target model’s structure and parameters. This strong assumption does not stand when
the protection is designed to use on human faces against face recognition models since the
target model is unknown and inaccessible directly.
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4.2.3

Other Methods

Su et al. [31] proposed One Pixel Attack that interferes with the prediction of target
classification neural network changing several to even just one pixel’s RGB value in an input
image. Under the extreme setting, the attack applies modification on only one pixel on
the original image, and the noise causes the target model to make mistakes. However, it is
a more heuristic idea than a practical solution. Only on a relatively low-resolution image
input setting, 32 by 32 pixel image from Cif ar10 [37] dataset, the model illustrates the best
performance. On high-resolution images, the attack needs a longer length of perturbation
and more pixels to be changed. The method uses differential evolution as the optimizer,
and the optimization is not efficient. The attack is in a black-box manner and demonstrates
the feature of many neural networks that some parts of the data are of more importance
than others. Papernot et al. [33] proposed the concept of Saliency Map to illustrate the
unbalance of the importance of the noises on different locations on the input images to
the final performance of the target model. The concept is similar to our definition of the
sensitivity map, but the Saliency Map is calculated based on the information of the target
model’s architecture and parameters. Also, the authors demonstrated the correlation of
the amount of information known about the target model and the difficulty of successfully
conducting an adversarial example attack. Later in 2017, the authors proposed a method
running in a black-box manner by building a substitute model. Although the method shows
competitive performance on MNIST [35] and GTSRD [36] dataset, building a substitute
model is not always an optimal bypass because of the high costs, especially when the target
models get more complicated. The very recent work of Shan et al. [76] illustrates the effective
protection for identity information against the deep learning face recognition models. The
methodology uses the feature vectors extracted from images of the closest wrong categories
to form the noise to add on the target images. Besides the high performance, the process
takes a relatively long time cost.
The mentioned methods for the privacy protection on visual data are either not practical
for industrial use or not specially designed for identity information protection on facial
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images. Therefore, we propose a method that addresses the demand of identity privacy and
is pragmatic for deployment requirements, which need the model to run real-time and in a
black-box manner.

4.3

Problem Description
The threat of information loss in social media is increasing nowadays [86–88]. The

identity information loss from images happens generally, especially with the increase of
everyone’s use of social media. Personal photos are uploaded to cloud for personal entertainment purposes, daily life recordings, or social connections, and even sometimes without
users’ intention when the digital devices automatically synchronize the photos with the service providers’ datasets. Also, the numerous live surveillance cameras take people’s photos
and send to online data processors regardless of people’s privacy concerns. Admittedly, everyone has official profiles publicly accessible online, either a personal web-page, a contact
information page on the website of company where he works, or a social media account
on FaceBook or LinkedIn. This form of disclosures of identity information is permitted by
the users. However, the openly published profile photos are a key source of information for
artificial intelligence models to discover a person’s identity. Thus, the identity information
loss from image data turns into the problem of how to prevent the high performing face
recognition models from accurately pairing the faces in the people’s private images and the
faces in their online official profile photos.
From this perspective, we propose a noise-adding scheme that generate noises on the
photos, where the users do not want their identity to be recognized from, to impede the
approach of identity information leak from the image data by obstructing the face recognition
models. We define the problem as a optimize problem with the function of the noise-adding
model and the term to be optimized (minimized in this case) is the target face recognition
models’ output confidence score of comparison between the openly accessible photo and the
private photos of the same person after the privacy protection process by the noise-adding
model.
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We set the original target image as a vector x with length or dimensions as H ∗ W and
each of the elements is a pixel. The target image x is the data sample that the protection
is performed on. The target face recognition model is noted as f . f takes input of the
standard image xstandard and the original image x and output a confidence score f (x, xstandard )
indicating how close the features extracted from both of the faces in the xstandard and x.
With a high confidence score over a pre-set threshold, the target model accounts the faces
as identical person and therefore the identity information from x is insecure. With a noise
vector e(x), which is to be added on the original target image x, the confidence score f (x +
e(x), xstandard ) is reduced compared to f (x, xstandard ). In this way, the identity privacy is
secured. In our case, we aim to develop a noise generator e for all xs with paired xstandard s.
The distortion needs to be in limited value, smaller than a adjustable threshold δ. Also, the
potency of the perturbation is expected to be maximized with the limitation of magnitude.
We introduce our solution to find the applicable noise generator.

maximize[f (x, xstandard ) − f (x + e(x), xstandard )]where e(x) ≤ δ

4.4

(4.1)

System Model
We propose a new designed noise-adding scheme, Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding

(SMNA), to prevent malicious machine learning powered computer vision models gaining
too much identity information from users’ image data, with the concept of adversarial example attack. The unauthorized face recognition models to be protected from are referred as
the targeted models. The SMNA is a noise-adding scheme, and it generates a subtle noise to
add on the original face image to be protected. The generated noise is hardly perceived by
human observers but causes influential impacts on the performance of the unauthorized face
recognition models. The existing methods for the privacy protection on visual data are either
not practical for industrial use or not specially designed for identity information protection
on face photos. Instead, our proposed method suits for the demand of identity privacy and
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is pragmatic for deployment requirements, which need the model to run real-time and in a
black-box manner.
The face recognition models show substantial capability of detecting faces from images
and extracting the features from the detected faces. In this way, the models can compare
the extracted the features of different faces, and compute the similarity scores or distances
between the faces. Finally, with a preset threshold from empirical experiences, the models can
reach a considerable high accuracy of prediction of whether the faces are from an identical
person in different images. However, the images with privacy protections performed by
SMNA, the accuracy of comparison is decreased in a significant amount with a proper set of
noise level.
The SMNA model is consisted by 3 components. The first is the concept of sensitivity
map. The second component is the sensitivity map generating GAN. The last is the final
noise-adding process based on the generated sensitivity map.
4.4.1

Sensitivity Map

The internal procedures of how a computer visual convolutional neural network works
have continuously been discussed, and there exist different explanations to reveal the theoretical bases. Most of the understandings toward the CNNs have a consensus that not all
of the input pixels have the equal importance to the final output results. Also the recently
developed mechanism of attention is based on this assumption. Thus, we propose our definition of conception of the sensitivity map. Each of the pixels in one input image has different
importance level for the final output, in other words, every pixel has its own sensitivity to
the target model. To determine a pixel’s sensitivity, we compare the difference of the outputs
of two exact same images except that one image is the original image and another one is
applied a certain kind of noise on the pixel. After conducting the same process on every pixel
on the original image and collecting the sensitivity of each pixel, we conclude a sensitivity
map of the image with the noise setting towards the target model. In this manner, the
sensitivity map is a direct demonstration of the sensitivity of each pixel on the image to be
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protected from the target model, and the sensitivity map illustrates how sensitive each pixel
is to noise.
The sensitivity map of image x is denoted as SM (x, xstandard , σ, f ), where the xstandard
is the public official image of the same person which is to be compared with image x by the
target model f to obtain the user’s identity information. The f is the target model which is
the face recognition model that the privacy protection is applied to. σ is the hyper-parameter
to set the type of noise adding on each of the pixel of the image x. The sensitivity map
has the same size of the original image x with only one channel. The value of pixel on the
sensitivity map is the sensitivity of the pixel on the original image x. The sensitivity map
is foundation of the SMNA model, as it is the weight and scale for the noise to add on the
original image. The algorithm to calculate SM (x, xstandard , σ, f ) is explained in Algorithm
5. H and W are the height and width of the shape x, and the SM is initialized as a matrix
with shape of H × W . Each element of the SM matrix is noted as a and ai,j represents the
element at row i and column j.
4.4.2

Sensitivity Map Generating GAN

Although the target model’s results can be significantly altered for a image modified by
noise with weights of its sensitivity map, the sensitivity map has a crucial drawback. The
calculation of one single sensitivity map needs a large number of queries to the target model,
and the number of queries is equal to the number of pixels of the original image. The larger
size one image has, the longer time and larger computation consumption its sensitivity costs
to be generated. Thus, we introduce a conditional GAN [89], the Sensitivity Map Generating
GAN(SMGG), to generate sensitivity maps for images in a swift speed without any queries
to the target model. The conditional GAN is different from regular traditional GAN which
can only generate data sample with noises. The conditional GAN is able to generate data
samples that fit the training dataset distribution while under certain conditions. The input
of the generator of the conditional GAN is not just random noises but the condition under
which the output data sample is generated. In this case, the input of the SMGG’s generator
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is the original image x, and the output is the predicted sensitivity map for the original image
x.
The generator of the GAN utilizes the structure of U-Net [90]. After the input layer that
takes the image data with size of H*W*3, which is the data shape of a RGB original image,
the convolutional layers keeps down-sampling until a bottle neck. Then, the outputted
feature map is sent to the up-sampling layers to reconstruct to the original image size.
Notably, the U-Net architecture uses skip connection, that each of the up-sampling layer
takes the concatenated combination of the feature map from the previous layer and the
feature map from the corresponding down-sampling layers as the input. By this design,
the generator implements an encoder in the first half of the U-Net structure to extract the
deep and shallow features from the input image, and the outputted feature maps of downsampling layers store the feature information and send them to the later part of the net.
The second half is a decoder that reconstructs the image using the features extracted by
the encoder. Also, the decoder needs to learn to deceive the discriminator, so that the final
output predicted sensitivity map has sufficient resemblance to the ground truth sensitivity
map.
The discriminator is the key role that helps the generator to learn the transformation
process of original image to its sensitivity map. The input of the discriminator is the pair of
the original image x and its corresponding sensitivity map concatenated. The optimization
goal of the discriminator is to successfully distinguish the ground truth sensitivity maps and
the predicted ones by the generator. The output of the discriminator is a decision matrix
indicating the score of the sensitivity map to be from the original distribution. If the input
is the combination of original image x and the ground truth sensitivity map, the elements
in the output matrix is to be close to 1. On the contrary, with the input of the original
image x and the sensitivity map predicted by the generator, the elements in the output
matrix of the discriminator is to 0. Figure 4.4. shows the design of the GAN and the
connections between the generator and the discriminator. For the generator, the input is
the original image x to be protected with the size of 64 × 64 × 3 and the output is the
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predicted sensitivity map G(x) with the size of 64 × 64 × 1. The structure of the generator
is consisted with 12 convolution layers. The layers Conv1 to Conv5 and the layers Conv7
to Conv11 are connected correspondingly by skip connection and shapes a U-Net where the
layer Conv6 is the bottleneck. During the training process, the discriminator takes inputs
of the concatenation of the image and the sensitivity map with the size of 64 × 64 × 4 and
determines whether the input is from the generator or the real dataset. When the input is
the tuple of [x, G(x)], the output of the discriminator D(x, G(x)) goes to 1s. Otherwise, if
the input is [x, y], the D(x, y) goes to 0s
In SMGG, the loss function of discriminator is similar to those of regular GANs, whereas
the loss function of the generator has one more item besides the normal generator loss. The
total generator loss is the sum of the binary cross entropy of 1 and the output score of
discriminator with input of predicted sensitivity map and the L1 Manhattan distance loss
between the predicted sensitivity map and the ground truth one of the input image. In the
training steps, the sensitivity map is a label for the GAN to be trained supervisedly. We
denote the ground truth sensitivity map SM (x, xstandard , σ, f ) as y and the raw images as x.
A and B are the matrices of 1s and 0s with the same shape as the discriminator’s output
matrix. The λ is the hyper-parameter to adjust the weight of the L1 loss to reach the balance
of the importance of losses for the better training result.

Lreal = Ex [CrossEntropy(D(x, y), A)]

(4.2)

Lgenerated = Ex [CrossEntropy(D(x, G(x)), B)]

(4.3)

LD = Lreal + Lgenerated

(4.4)

LGAN = Ex [CrossEntropy(D(x, G(x)), A)]

(4.5)

LL1 = Ex [|G(x) − y|]

(4.6)

LG = LGAN + λ ∗ LL1

(4.7)
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The SMGG learns the projection relationship between the original images and their sensitivity maps, under particular circumstances as the preset other parameters in the SM along with
the image x. To train the SMGG to learn to generate sensitivity maps, we need construct
the specialized training dataset.
The dataset is formed by pairs of images x and its corresponding ground truth sensitivity
map y calculated by direct queries to the target model. The y works as the label to the
image and helps the SMGG to understand the pattern of translating data from the space of
RGB images into the space of sensitivity maps. The official images of xstandard for images
of different people are destined to be not same, and all the sensitivity maps are calculated
under the same noise type setting and by the same target model. The dataset is the essential
source that the SMGG learn the features of the images and features of the target model’s
systematic operations on images generally. For each training step, the input data sample is
the tuple of a target image and its sensitivity map, [x, y]. With the input x for the generator
G and the input [x, y] and [x, G(x)] for the discriminator D, the model gets the loss for both
G and D. Then, the weights θg of G and θd of D are updated according to the losses. The
trained SMGG can produce sensitivity map of a given image for the assured noise type and
target model, regardless of the standard image.
The whole process of training SMGG is shown in Algorithm 6.
4.4.3

Noise Addition

The final step of the SMNA model is to add a subtle noise on the original image to be
protected. The noise is mainly decided by the predicted sensitivity map, both the type of
the noise and the weights of noise on each pixel. The hyper-parameter of noise level is to
adjust the overall density of the noise, and it is a trade-off game. A higher noise level makes
the noise more visible by human eyes and more secure from information loss to the target
model. The integrated noise addition algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm Noise Addition.
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4.5

Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the settings and design of the simulation, and then

show the experiment results and discuss the performance. In the subsection, Target Model
and Dataset, we show the details of the setting of the target model and the constitution of the
dataset for training and testing. In the subsection, GAN Model Structure, we elaborate the
shape and connection relationship of each layer of the GAN-based model. In the subsection,
Test Results, we present the overall performance of the proposed model on the dataset and
two examples for illustration
4.5.1

Target Model and Dataset

The objective of the proposed SMNA model is to protect the identity information contained in image data. To be more precisely, the function of the generated noise is to lower
the target model’s performance of face verification. The noise added on the original image
need to prevent the face recognition models obtaining the confirmation of similarity of faces
detected in one person’s private images and his online accessible official portrait.
To test the performance of the noise generation model, we set up the experiment in
the following settings. The target model the experiment is conducted on is the FaceNet.
FaceNet is one of the most famous face verification and recognition model and frequently
takes the role as the baseline algorithm in the field. The integrated target model includes
a Multi-task Cascaded Convolutional Network (MTCNN) [91] to detect the faces in the
original input image, and then a FaceNet to extract and compare the features vectors. The
target model [92] is pretrained on dataset VGGFace2 [93] and reaches the accuracy of 99.65%
on the dataset of Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW). The integrated FaceNet model takes
inputs images and outputs the verification results as the distance between the embeddings
of the images.
With the target model, we construct a new celebrity face photo dataset. The dataset
contains faces of 102 celebrities and each person has 1 of the standard target official portrait
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and 20 other face photos to be protected. The dataset has the total of 2163 images where 102
of them are standard image and the rest of 2060 images are to be used as training and testing
data samples. The data has the size of 64 by 64 pixels and 3 channels as RGB values. All of
the images have the corresponding sensitivity maps calculated by testing the sensitivity of
noise on every pixel of the image to the target model. The sensitivity maps have the shape
of 64 × 64 × 1 which matches the resolution of the images. The dataset is formed by data
tuples and each tuple is the pair of the image and its sensitivity map.
4.5.2

GAN Model Structure

The generator of the Sensitivity Map Generating GAN in this particular experiment is
designed to take the input of raw image with size of 64×64×3 as the condition and output the
generated sensitivity map. The generator uses the down-sampling 2D convolutional layers
for the first half of the network to shrink size of the feature map to the bottleneck and the
up-sampling transpose 2D convolutional layers in the last half to reform the feature maps
back to the size of the resolution of original image. In different layers, the model extracts
the features of the input image of low or high levels. Also the design of skip connection
curtails the risk of losing information during the reshaping of the feature maps. The detailed
structure of the generator for this experiment is shown in the Table 1.
The discriminator of the GAN has a more straightforward structure. The input is the
tuple of the original image and its sensitivity map either generated by the generator or from
the ground truth. The image and the sensitivity map is concatenated and the tuple has the
shape of 64 × 64 × 4. The output of the discriminator is a decision matrix shaped as 30 by
30, where each of the elements is a score between 0 and 1 indicating whether the tuple is
from the ground truth or from the generator. The illustration of the architecture is in the
Table 2.
The integrated model is trained on the dataset with two settings of the sensitivity map
of different kinds of noises added to the raw image. We set the noise type to be the white
noise and the black noise, and the noise is applied to the pixel by changing the RGB value
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to either all 0s and 255s. The noise generator produced the sensitivity maps work as the
weights for the noises added to the raw images with a hyper-parameter η which controls the
noise level. A larger value of η which is a higher level of protection leads to greater impact
on the target model’s accuracy of correct verification of the face, but it also causes a more
perceivable alteration from the unadjusted image. The training of the GAN takes 200 epochs
on the training set of 95% of the entire dataset.
4.5.3

Test Results

The test results are shown in the following table 3. The four columns shows the results
of the protections by the noises based the sensitivity maps from different sources. The Black
y and the White y are protection result by the sensitivity maps from the ground truth in
the dataset, and the Black G(x) and the White G(x) are by the generated sensitivity maps
by our model. The protections using the ground truth sensitivity maps from the dataset
have the better performance comparing to those using the generated ones. However, the
calculation for those ground truth sensitivity maps are not affordable for practical uses. The
protection by the proposed model achieve a good level of protection based on the fact that
the same operation can be conducted on any images in a fast speed for the target model.
The original average distance between the 102 images in the test set with their target public
photo is 0.788. We can see the noises added to the raw photo work effectively interfering
the target models performance on a large scale. On the noise level of 1250, the average of
distance increases to 0.935 with the noises generated based on the sensitivity maps by the
GAN, which is more than 18.5% of increase while the total amount of noise added to the
original image is still acceptable by human observers. The trade-off always exits, that the
noise level can be set higher with a more visible noise sacrificing the information details to
achieve a more strict protection of privacy.
Figure 4.5. shows the example of the protection on the photos of Sheldon Adelson
and Dwayne Johnson. The protection results are generated by four different kinds of the
sensitivity maps. From the left to the right, Blacky is the ground truth sensitivity map of
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black noise calculated by calling to the target model. The BlackG(x) is the sensitivity map
of black noise generated by the proposed model. Similarly, the W hitey and W hiteG(x) are
those of white noises. The noise level are set from 500 to 1250 and the larger the noise level,
the more easily the perturbation is noticeable. Below the images are the distance between
the image and the target profile photo shown beside. The target profile photos are the profile
images of their Wikipedia pages [94] [95]. The protected image of Sheldon Adelson is from
a report of ABC News [96] and Dwayne Johnson’s protected image is from the Hollywood
Reporter News [97]. The original distances by FaceNet between the two faces are 0.88 and
0.95.

4.6

Conclusion
Aiming at solving the problem of identity information privacy from face photos to the

face recognition models, we propose a fully black-box privacy protection model for face image
data, the Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding model. The model adds subtle noises to original
data based on the sensitivity maps which are produced by a GAN structured generator. The
concept of sensitivity of an image works impressively for the task and the design of the noise
generation model functions well for learning the features in the ground truth sensitivity maps
to understand the weak points on the images for the target model. The whole process is
free from requesting information from the target face recognition model, and only calling the
target model at the stage of the preparation the dataset for the training of the sensitivity map
generation GAN. The overall performance of the privacy protection model is good against
benchmark face recognition model FaceNet. The noise generation procedure is effect and
efficient that the algorithm can be run on a real-time level for video data at 30 frames per
second.
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Algorithm 5: Calculation of ground truth SM.
Input: x, xstandard , σ and f .
for h ← 0 to H do
for w ← 0 to W do
xmodif ied ← x + σ Noise at the location (h, w);
ah,w ← f (x, xstandard ) − f (xmodif ied , xstandard );
end
end
Return SM
Skip Connection

Sensitivity Map 𝐺(𝑥)

Input Image 𝑥

Decision
Matrix
𝐷 𝑥, 𝐺 𝑥
𝐅𝐚𝐤𝐞
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Upsample

Generator

Input Image 𝑥
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Decision
Matrix
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𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥

𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐚𝐭

Discriminator

Figure 4.4. The Structure of the Sensitivity Map Generating GAN.
Algorithm 6: The Training Process of SMGG
while not converging do
Sample a minibatch of the data tuples [x, y] from the dataset.;
Generate adversarial examples G(x) by the generator G;
Calculate the decision matrix D(x, y) and D(x, G(x)) by the discriminator D;
Update the generator’s weight θg by descending along the gradient ∇θg LossG ;
Update the discriminator’s weight θd by descending along the gradient
∇θd LossD ;
end
Algorithm 7: Noise Addition
Input: x, G, δ.
N oiseM ap = G(x) − M ean(G(x));
δ
N oiseLevel = |N oiseM
;
ap|
xmodif ied = x + N oiseLevel ∗ N oiseM ap
Return xmodif ied
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Table 4.1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE GENERATOR
Layer Name
Conv1
Conv2
Conv3
Conv4
Conv5
Conv6
Conv7
Conv8
Conv9
Conv10
Conv11
Conv12

Layer Operation
4 × 4 × 64, Conv2D, lReLU
4 × 4 × 128, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 256, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2DTranspose, BN,
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2DTranspose, BN,
4 × 4 × 256, Conv2DTranspose, BN,
4 × 4 × 128, Conv2DTranspose, BN,
4 × 4 × 64, Conv2DTranspose, BN,
4 × 4 × 1, Conv2DTranspose

lReLU
lReLU
lReLU
lReLU
lReLU

Out Shape
32 × 32 × 64
16 × 16 × 128
8 × 8 × 256
4 × 4 × 512
2 × 2 × 512
1 × 1 × 512
2 × 2 × 1024
4 × 4 × 1024
8 × 8 × 512
16 × 16 × 256
32 × 32 × 128
64 × 64 × 1

Table 4.2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DISCRIMINATOR
Layer Name
Conv1
Padding1
Conv2
Conv3
Conv4
Padding2
Conv5

Layer Operation
4 × 4 × 256, Conv2D
0 Padding
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
4 × 4 × 512, Conv2D, BN, lReLU
0 Padding
4 × 4 × 1, Conv2D

Out Shape
32 × 32 × 256
34 × 34 × 256
31 × 31 × 512
31 × 31 × 512
31 × 31 × 512
33 × 33 × 512
30 × 30 × 1

Table 4.3. AVERAGE DISTANCES OF DATA PROTECTED ON DIFFERENT LEVELS
NoiseLevel 500
NoiseLevel 750
NoiseLevel 1000
NoiseLevel 1250

Black y
1.033
1.107
1.156
1.188

Black G(x)
0.831
0.865
0.901
0.935

White y
0.973
1.042
1.084
1.120

White G(x)
0.815
0.837
0.867
0.896
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Figure 4.5. The Case Examples of the Protection Results.
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Chapter 5

FACEADVGAN: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE BASED IDENTITY PRIVACY
PROTECTION MODEL

Face recognition technology has been developed significantly by the rapid advances in
computer vision and deep neural networks. Besides the conveniences the face recognition
models brought to us, identity privacy leakage becomes a great concern. The high run speed
and accuracy of the face recognition models help the service providers reveal the identity
information contained in users’ personal photos without the users’ permission or attention.
Thus, an applicable identity privacy protection scheme for personal images is necessary. In
this paper, we introduce FaceAdvGAN, a noise generation model that runs in a fast speed
and fully black-box manner. The model is able to create noises based on original images and
perform effective and efficient protection against state-of-the-art face recognition models.

5.1

Motivation
With the progress of the industry of electronics, the total amount of data collected is

increasing boomingly attributed to the wide use of personal electronic smart devices and the
expanded deployment of electronic sensors of infrastructure for smart city and the internet of
things. Additionally, the upgrade of computation power and data storage and transmission
technology in recent years lead to the advancement in the development of artificial intelligence
algorithms. These technologies have fundamentally changed the way to process and analyse
the information and infiltrated into many aspects of peoples’ daily life. Although some
scholars provide methods to protect privacy with newer learning mechanisms [98, 99], the
mainstream of applications still uses the traditional cloud computing. Among the numerous
types of data, visual data is one of the most commonly used and valued types of data
to be utilized for various applications. People share pictures and videos on their social
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Figure 5.1. Illustration of FaceAdvGAN Framework.

media accounts. The surveillance camera systems and other smart devices record, store,
and upload visual data constantly. The information contained in the photos and videos
can be automatically analyzed and extracted by the deep-learning-based computer vision
models for further use as emotion recognition [100], health condition monitoring systems
[54] [55], and public safety and security solutions [57] [58] [59]. Besides the convenience,
people suffer from the by-product of the data-based applications, which is privacy leakage.
Although the scholars propose privacy preserved mechanisms [101, 102], the escalation of
efficiency in information extraction and analysis increases the vulnerability of privacy of
identity information. Through the face recognition models developed these years based on
deep learning with the high performance and the stability [68] [69] [70] [8], the malicious
party can build a connection between the visual data to the real persons by revealing the
identity information at a much lower time and labor cost. Many deep-learning-model-based
face recognition techniques are openly accessible for personal and business uses with a modest
expense from the online service providers such as Microsoft [29], Amazon [27], and Google
[28]. The linkage from the information contained in visual data to peoples’ real identities can
cause severe loss. For instance, the human tracking applications based on face recognition
models are able to perceive the daily routine and activities information of a specific person
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in interest from the visual data, such as shopping in malls, jogging in parks, or walking to
banks. The combination of the identity information and this knowledge of a person enables
the scammers to perform a very persuasive and indiscernible fraud to the victim.
Therefore, the need for privacy protection models to protect the confidential content
in visual data is imperative. One key point to prevent the risk of loss by further sensitive
information leakage is cutting the connection between the identity information with other
information contained in the visual data. Thus, an identity information encryption model
is needed to hide the identity information by interfering with the work of face recognition
models while maintaining the maximum data quality to keep the data usable for other
applications and readable for human observers. The protection procedure needs to alter
the raw data precisely and subtly to yield an influential impact on the performance of
face recognition models, so the identity information contained in the image data is kept
confidential from the computer vision models without evident alteration. Not only a good
level of effectiveness but also a high degree of efficiency the identity privacy protection model
needs to be able to run on real-time speed to leave the rest of services based on the protected
data functioning such as action recognition and emotion recognition.
To meet the requirement of the industrial applicable identity privacy protection from
face recognition models, we utilize the idea of adversarial example attack [85]. The deeplearning-based face recognition models share a conspicuous deficiency in the stability of
performance due to the nature of the training process and structure design of deep convolutional neural networks(CNN). The work proposed in [85] indicates the characteristic of
many deep-learning-driven models that the performance of the deep learning models can
be intensely lowered by the input image with only a subtle noise added, and the noise can
be hardly noticeable by human observers. When the data inputs are switched from the
data sample collected from the normal world and distribution to the elaborately modified
instances, the CNN model shows the abnormal behavior. The elaborately generated trivial perturbations on the modified data sample mislead the CNN system to misclassify the
processed input data samples into classes that are different from the ground truth labels.
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Similarly, we can generate noises on the original face image as generating adversarial examples to precipitate the malfunction of the target face recognition deep learning models and
protect the identity information. In this way, the modification of the original data can be
small and subtle, but the protection process requires the full knowledge of the target face
recognition model, including the model structure and parameters. Although, the adversarial
example generation can be conducted with a surrogate model to bypass the need of full
access of the target model, with the assumption of the transferability and similarity of the
target model and surrogate model. Still, the normal adversarial example generation through
backpropagation needs iterative runs and makes time cost. This prerequisite vastly limits
the deployability in real cases and makes the applicability low for industrial use.
Thus, we propose to use the generative adversarial network (GAN) [103] to avoid the
limitations of process of generating adversarial examples. The GAN model is able to generate new data samples that follows the patterns of the data used in training stage. Also, the
conditional generative adversarial network (cGAN) [104] is able to conduct the generation
of new data samples based on certain auxiliary given information which is the condition.
Based on the conditions, the cGAN can realize many functions such as the transition of
styles of visual data [89]. Overall, we propose an identity privacy protection model FaceAdvGAN. The model is cGAN structured and is able provide privacy protection on face images
by generating adversarial examples in real-time and black-box manner against target face
recognition models. In order to train the FaceAdvGAN model, we use an adversarial example
dataset of pairs of the face images and their corresponding noise masks to train the proposed
model. FaceAdvGAN can generate noises to images only by the original images and in a
non-iterative manner. An illustration of how FaceAdvGAN works in shown in Figure 5.1.
The figure shows FaceAdvGAN performing privacy protection on image. The similarity is
calculated by ArcFace [70], and the threshold is set to be 0.24698813 which is the optimal
value for LFW [?] dataset.
After the noises are applied to the original image, the identity information of the image
is protected from the face recognition models.
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The main contributions of this work are highlighted as follows:
• We propose the FaceAdvGAN model, an identity information protection model against
deep learning face recognition models. The model provides privacy protection on face
image data by trivial noises in a complete black-box and real-time manner without any
information from and queries to the target models.
• We provide a well-trained lite version of the FaceAdvGAN model which is ready for
industrail use, utilizing an adversarial example dataset against face recognition models
with existing generalization methods to produce the effective adversarial examples for
face recognition models.
• We make discussion of the performance of the FaceAdvGAN model with various archetectures and settings based on extensive experiment results. The comparison of the
difference of the performance by the designs of FaceAdvGANs suggets the direction of
further researches for future studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the literature
related to our topic including the work in the researches of adversarial attacks, generative
adversarial networks (GAN), deep face recognition models, and adversarial attacks against
deep face models. In Section III, we present the proposed approach of identity information
protection of image data against deep face models, FaceAdvGAN. We introduce our design
of the GAN-based adversarial example generator model FaceAdvGAN for deep face models
and the selection of transferable adversarial example dataset for training use. In Section
IV, we demonstrate the performance of our proposed FaceAdvGAN model. We present the
setting of the experiments and the metrics for evaluation and provide the results of the
experiment for illustration of the performance of FaceAdvGAN. Also, we show the study on
hyperparameters tuning for the model and provide an explanation of the difference of results
for better comprehension of FaceAdvGAN. Section V summarizes the conclusions.
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5.2

Related Work
In this section, we briefly introduce and review the work related to our topic. The first

subsection focuses on the researches of adversarial examples. The second subsection reviews
the study of GAN. The third subsection is about the development deep face recognition
models. The last subsection summarize the attack methods for deep face recognition models.
5.2.1

Adversarial Examples

We first introduce several mainstream methods for white-box attacks in the field.
Szegedy et al. [9]. are the first team of researcher who discover the feature of adversarial examples to DCNNs. The researchers propose a box-constrained LBFGS method to
generate hardly perceptible perturbations. However, the method is time-consuming and not
efficient. Goodfellow et al. [85] later propose the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to generate adversarial examples for a much faster speed. The method performs one-step gradient
updating by certain value with the sign of the gradient at pixel-level. Based on FGSM, Kurakin et al. [105] develop the fast target gradient sign method (FTGSM) to produce targeted
adversarial attacks, which mislead the DCNN to misclassify the adversarial example into
specific target wrong category. In the settings of FTGSM, the source image is denoted by
x(s) with original label y (s) . The target label is denoted by y (t) . The generated adversarial
example is formulated as
xadv = x(s) + ∆x

(5.1)

∆x = −sign(∇x(s) J(x(s) , y (t) )),

(5.2)

where J denotes the cross-entropy loss function and  is a hyperparameter to adjust the
maximum deviation of the overall perturbation.
Also, Kurakin et al. propose the basic iterative method (BIM) to repeat the algorithm
of FGSM to reach a higher attack success rate. Similar to BIM, the iterative target gradient
sign method (ITGSM) is the iterative version for FTGSM and is formulated as
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xadv,0 = x(s)

xadv,N +1 = Cx(s) , (xadv,N −

(5.3)

(5.4)

sign(∇xadv,N J(xadv,N , y (t) ))),
Where xadv,i denotes the ith iteration of update of generated adversarial example. C is a
constrain function defined by Cx, (x0 ) = min(255, x + , max(0, x − , x0 )). The iterative
attacks obtain a higher attack success rate but the transferability is limited.
Besides the attack methods in white-box setting, the black-box attacks with transferability are more practical and useful in real-world applications. The mainstream black-box
attacks use surrogate models to generate adversarial example as the real target model is
not accessible [106–111]. Also, the trained surrogate models are static and do not change
during the adversarial examples generation process. Instead, Zhong et al. [6] propose a
method of construction of the surrogate models to generate adversarial example to attack
face recognition models. The generation of surrogate models incorporate dynamic dropout
in the convolutional layers to increase the diversity and variability of surrogate model to
enhance the attack transferability.
5.2.2

Generative Adversarial Networks

The concept of generative adversarial networks (GAN) is first introduce by Goodfellow
et al. [4] in 2014. After then, the development of GAN has achieved very high performance
and impressive results in many fields. GAN consists of two sub-models: a generator denoted
as G and a discriminator denoted as D. The two sub-models play against each other in a
min-max game, where G generates data samples to mimic a real data distribution to fool
D, and D judges whether input data sample is a real data sample or a fake data sample
generated by G. In the language of mathematics, G(z) is the output sample drawn from pg
where z is a low dimensional vector sampled from a prior distribution pz . The discriminator
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D takes input data and output an indicator that classifies the data from G(z) as fake and
the data from training set pdata as real. In all, GAN is expressed as a structured probabilistic
model to optimize the loss function designed as following:
min max LGAN (G, D) = Ex∼pdata (x) [log D(x)]+
G

D

(5.5)
Ez∼pg (z) [1 − log D(G(z))],

where G aims to minimize the loss function LGAN (G, D) and D to maximize it.
[112, 113] present the GAN’s ability in image generation. [89, 114–116] demonstrate
the image-to-image translation applications. [117–119] develop GANs for style transferring.
Among all the works, many utilize the idea of conditional GAN [104], such as [120] that
uses attributes to generate images. The conditional GAN is different from regular traditional GAN which can only generate data sample with noises. The conditional GAN is able
to generate data samples that fit the training dataset distribution while keeping some of
the features of the input. The input of the generator of the conditional GAN is not just
random noises but the attributes based on which the output image is generated. For example, CycleGAN [115] keeps the key attributes between the input and the translated images
by a specially designed cycle consistency loss. In our work, we use the idea of conditional
GAN build our model to learn the feature representation of the face images for generating adversarial examples to attack face recognition networks and thus protect the identity
information.
5.2.3

Face recognition

The development and success of DCNNs in face recognition are undeniable. The DCNNbased face recognition models achieve an unprecedented level of performance. A well-trained
face recognition model can reveal the identity information contained in an image by extracting the features of the face and comparing the feature vector with other feature vectors from other photos to determine whether the faces belong to same person. The success of the face recognition is mainly attributed to three kinds of the methodologies. Re-
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searches [69, 93, 121–128] learn discriminative deep face representation through face identity
classification with large-scale training databases. The models proposed in [8, 70, 129–134]
use effectively designed training loss functions. Additionally, advanced network architectures also contribute to the advancement in performance [16, 68, 69, 93, 124, 126].
5.2.4

Attacks Against Face Recognition Models

Face recognition systems reach a very high accuracy and are deployed in many domains.
The wide range of applications raises safety issues of the abuse of face recognition services.
Therefore, the protection on image data is necessary to avoid the privacy leakage to the malicious use of face recognition models. Previous works [78, 135–137] propose several methods
to perform attacks on face recognition models. Some attacks on face recognition models are
based on adversarial examples, but mainly in a white-box setting [135, 138–141]. [77, 78] apply the GAN structured models to generate adversarial examples to attack deep face models.
However, Yang et al. [78] propose the AdvFaces model and the model needs queries to the
target model and thus not in a full box-box setting.

5.3

System Model
In this section, we propose FaceAdvGAN, an identity protection model on image data

against face recognition models. FaceAdvGAN is trained on an adversarial example dataset
of pairs of original face images and their adversarial examples noises generated based on a
delicately designed surrogate face recognition model.
5.3.1

Problem Statement

The identity privacy loss from face images in this information era usually comes with
the widely-using fully automatic face recognition models. With everyone’s increase of use of
social media and cloud storage services, extensive amount of personal photos are uploaded
online for miscellaneous reasons everyday. The uploading happens voluntarily or sometimes
even without users’ notice, when the smart digital devices automatically read or collect data
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from camera sensor. Also, the more advanced infrastructure of live surveillance camera
systems for smart city and public safty causes a greater generation of photo data and share
the data regardless of people’s permission or privacy concerns. Along with the increasing
computation power and decrease of deployment cost, personal photos are more accessable
to the online face recognition services than ever. In this way, the identity privacy is to be
prejudiced in a faster and easier way. Thus, the identity privacy can be reserved if a noise
is applied to the personal photos and decreases the accuracy of successfully predicting the
ownership of the photo by the face recognition models. From this perspective, we propose a
noise-generation model, FaceAdvGAN, to generate adversarial noises against face recognition
models while maintaining the quality of the original photo data.
We denote the original input face image as a vector x with dimensions as H ∗ W where
each of the elements is a pixel. The face recognition model is noted as f . f takes input of
the original image x and other images xs s of the same person, which have the same label
as x, and xo s of the other person, which have diffenret labels from x. With each input x, f
outputs a vector as the extracted feature f (x). Similarly, with inputs of xs and xo , f outputs
f (xs ) and f (xo ). To determine whether the input images have the same label, i.e., belong
to the same person, the face recognition schemes compare the distance of the outputs by f .
If the distance f (x) − f (x0 ) is larger than a pre-set threshold, the face recognition model
predicts that the inputs x and x0 share the same label, and vice versa. Here, we set a noise
generator e to generate a vector e(x) with input image x. The noise vector e(x) has the same
dimensions as x and the amplitude of e(x) is constrained by an adjustable hyperparameter
δ. We consider the problem as an optimization problem and our goal is to find the noise
generator e to optimize the following equation.
maximize[f (x + e(x)) − f (xs )]
minimize[f (x + e(x)) − f (xo )]
where e(x) ≤ δ

(5.6)
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With the noise e(x) added to the image x, the output f (x+e(x)) is affected and thus the
final decision of the identity recognition is impeded. Consequencely, the identity information
is protected from the face recognition model and the privacy is reserved. Also, to ensure
the practicality, the noise generator e needs to run in fully black-box manner, completely
unaware of any information of the face models f . Further, for the purpose of real-time
protection, the e’s run speed needs to be fast and steady, not in an iterative manner. The
traditional adversarial example generation is effective but does not meet the requirements.
In later sections, we introduce our solution to find the applicable noise generator.
5.3.2

Generator Architecture

To construct the generator G to meet our requirement of effective privacy protection,
we utilize the design of the Auto-Encoder (AE) [142]. AE is originally an unsupervised
neural network that learns a mapping function from input data x to output x̃ = h(x). The
optimizaiotn process of the learned mapping function is to reach the minimum distance
between x and x̃. Additionally, AE consists of two parts: the Encoder and the Decoder.
The Encoder transforms data input x from a real data distribution and then encodes original
input into a latent representation z, i.e., z ∼ Encoder(x) = q(z|x). During this process, the
output feature maps shrink their sizes after passing each downsampling layer until a final
bottleneck layer. On the contrary, the Decoder part takes the output of the bottleneck layer
of the encoder, the low-dimension representation z. Then, with the upsampling layers, the
Decoder reconstructs the real data x, x̃ ∼ Decoder(z) = p(x|z).
The original loss function of AE is defined as following:

min LAE (Enc, Dec) = Dis(x, Dec ◦ Enc(x)),

Enc,Dec

(5.7)

where Encoder and Decoder are represented as Enc and Dec respectively, and Dis denotes selected distance metrics. ◦ is the composite function of the Encoder and the Decoder.
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of The Traditional AE and U-Net.

The traditional AE is powerful to learn the important features at different levels of the
original input data and reconstruct the original image at the same high dimension only with
the low dimension feature.
However, in our case, we need more than merely reconstruct the feature to the original
input but to project the data from the original distribution to a new distribution with pointto-point correspondence of every pair of data sample. More specifically, the original data
distribution is the real photo image distribution, whereas the reconstructed output needs to
approximate the adversarial example generated based on the original input data, which falls
into a different data distribution. The each data sample in the distribution of real photo has
a corresponding data sample in the adversarial example distribution. The architecture of the
noise generator needs the ability to perform such projection. So, we utilize the U-Net [90]
form of AE which better meets our need. Unlike the traditional AE where the Encoder
and the Decoder are only connected by the bottleneck layer, U-Net adds skip-connections
between multiple layers of the Encoder and the Decoder. The skip-connection concatenate
the outputs of the i-th downsampling layer of Encoder and the (n − i)-th upsampling layer of
Decoder, who share the same size of the output feature map. Then, the concatenated feature
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maps are feed to the next upsampling layer of Decoder. An illustration of the structures
between traditional AE and U-Net AE is shown in Figure 5.2.
In the traditional AE, the Encoder takes input x and outputs the latent z and the
Encoder takes it as input to build x̃. But in U-Net AE, the feature maps output by the
Encoder at different depth and sizes are all taken as input by the Decoder. In this design, the
Decoder can construct the x̃ with more features comparing to the Decoder in the traditional
AE. In our design, the noise generator e uses the U-Net AE structure to transform the
original input image x to e(x) by projecting x from the distribution of real photo to the
distribution of adversarial examples.
5.3.3

GAN Architecture

With the design of the noise generator e, we then present our design of the architecture
and training strategy of the complete FaceAdvGAN. To train the e to generate the adversarial
noise entirely based on the input original image x, we construct the FaceAdvGAN in a
conditional GAN(cGAN) [89] style. The FaceAdvGAN consists of the Generator G and the
Discriminator D. Regular traditional GAN is only able to generate data samples that fit the
training dataset distribution from random noise vectors, but the cGAN is able to generate
data samples under certain conditions. The input of G of the cGAN can be more specifically
composed or selected to influence or even control the generation of output. In this way,
cGAN is able to perform image-to-image translation like style-changing. In our design of
FaceAdvGAN, the generator G is the noise generator e and the input of the generator is the
original image x which is the condition.
The D is the key role that helps the G to learn the transformation process of original
image to the adversarial example noise. The input of D of the cGAN is either a real transformation pair (x,y), which is the original image x and its corresponding adversarial example
noise y = xadv − x, where xadv is the adversarial example generated from x, or a fake one
(x,G(x)), which is the original image x and the generated noise by G(x). The output of D is
a decision matrix indicating the noise item in the input tuple is generated by the authentic
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adversarial example process or the G. The optimization goal of the D is to distinguish the
input tuple is a real pair or not, and the generator is to deceive the D. Figure shows the
design of the FaceAdvGAN and the relation between the generator and the discriminator.
Let I and I 0 be the set of tuples of original image data and adversarial example noise
(x,y)∈ I and the set of tuples of original image data and the generated noise (x,G(x))∈ I 0 .
In our design of FaceAdvGAN, the loss function is designed as the following:
LF aceAdvGAN (G, D) = LcGAN (G, D)

(5.8)

+λ ∗ Ldis (G)

LcGAN = E(x,G(x))∼I 0 [1 − log(D(x, G(x))]+

(5.9)

E(x,y)∼I [log(D(x, y)]
Ldis = Ex [|G(x) − (y)|],

(5.10)

where LcGAN is the combined loss function of the G and D, Ldis is the distance loss
indicating the distance between G(x) and y, and λ is a parameter to adjust the weights
of the loss objects. According to the loss function design, the training process helps us to
obtain the optimal result G∗ which is

G∗ = arg min max[LcGAN (G, D) + λ ∗ Ldis (G)].
G

(5.11)

D

G∗ is expected to be able to generate noises similar to the noises of real adversarial
examples. The training process is described as following:

5.4

Performance Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce the settings and design of the experiment, and then

show the results and discuss the performance.
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Algorithm 8: The Training Process of FaceAdvGAN
while not converging do
Sample a minibatch of the data tuples [x, y] from the dataset.;
Generate noises G(x) by the generator G;
Calculate the decision matrix D(x, y) and D(x, G(x)) by the discriminator D;
Update the generator’s weight θg by descending along the gradient ∇θg LG ;
Update the discriminator’s weight θd by descending along the gradient ∇θd LD ;
end
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Figure 5.3. System Framework of FaceAdvGAN.

5.4.1

FaceAdvGAN Model Structure

In this subsection, we introduce our design of the FaceAdvGAN in detail. The generator
G of the FaceAdvGAN in this experiment is designed to take the input of face image data
x in size of 128 × 128 × 3 and output the noise vector G(x) of the same size as x. The
discriminator D takes input of tuple (x, y) or (x, G(x), both in size of 128 × 128 × 6, and
outputs a decision matrix. The overall architecture is shown in Figure 5.3. The model
contains a generator G and a discriminator D. G is shaped as U-Net. The G and D are
trained together.
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Table 5.1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DOWNSAMPLE BLOCK (RESIDUAL)
Layer Name
Conv1
Conv2
Conv3
Residual1
Conv4
Conv5
Residual2
Conv6
Conv7
Residual3
Conv8
Conv9
Residual4

Layer Operation
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D,
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D
1 × 1 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Conv2,Conv3)
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D,
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Residual1,Conv5)
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D,
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Residual2,Conv7)
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D,
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Residual3,Conv9)

ReLU

ReLU

ReLU

ReLU

Table 5.2. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UPSAMPLE BLOCK (RESIDUAL)
Layer Name
Conv1
Conv2
Conv3
Residual1
Conv4
Conv5
Residual2

Layer Operation
4 × 4 × f ilters, Conv2DTranspose
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D, ReLU
1 × 1 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Conv1,Conv3)
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D, ReLU
3 × 3 × f ilters, Conv2D
Add(Residual1,Conv5)

The generator has 7 Downsample blocks and 6 U psample blocks, and the discriminator
only contains 4 Downsample blocks. Each of the Downsample blocks shrinks the size of the
data in half and Each of the U psample blocks expand the size by 2. In this way, the sizes
of output and the input of the generator remain the same. The first 6 of the Downsample
and U psample blocks in G are connected by skip connection.
We design a residual version of the Downsample and U psample blocks and the detailed
structure of is shown in the Table 1 and 2. The residual version of the blocks uses residual
layers send the output of the previous layers to deeper of the networks to keep the extracted
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Table 5.3. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DOWNSAMPLE BLOCK (LITE)
Layer Name
Conv1
Activation1

Layer Operation
4 × 4 × f ilters, Conv2D
LeakyReLU

Table 5.4. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UPSAMPLE BLOCK (LITE)
Layer Name
Conv1
Activation1

Layer Operation
4 × 4 × f ilters, Conv2DTranspose
LeakyReLU

features more advantageously. Also, we present a lite version of the design which is shown
in the Table 3 and 4. The lite version has a much simpler structure and the run speed is
naturally accelerated.
5.4.2

Experiment Results

Both of the FaceAdvGAN-Residual and FaceAdvGAN-Lite models are trained on
TALFW [6] dataset and tested on LFW dataset by 3 of the state-of-the-art face recognition
models, ArcFace [70], SphereFace [129], and VggFace2 [93]. The test results are shown in
Table. 5.
The ArcFace model reaches over 99.03% of prediction accuracy on original LFW dataset
with best threshold setting. After the face photos are protected by FaceAdvGAN-Residual
model, the accuracy drops to 82.77%. Further with the FaceAdvGAN-Lite model, the accuracy drops to 76.87%. Similarly, with the SphereFace model, the original accuracy of
recognition is 98.21%. The protection provided by FaceAdvGAN-Residual model lowers the
accuracy to 82.20%, and moreover the FaceAdvGAN-Lite model shows effectiveness of the
protection that decrease the accuracy to 77.06%. For VggFace2 [93], the prediction accuracy
is 97.98% on unprotected dataset. FaceAdvGAN-Residual model and FaceAdvGAN-Lite
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Table 5.5. TEST RESULTS OF FACEADVGAN
Original LFW
FaceAdvGAN-Residual
FaceAdvGAN-Lite

ArcFace [70]
99.03%
82.77%
76.87%

SphereFace [129]
98.21%
82.20%
77.06%

VggFace2 [93]
97.98%
87.51%
84.75%

model reduce the accuracy to 87.51% and 84.75% at the same level of threshold with the
original set.
Further, we show some case examples tested on commercial face recognition APIs. We
use Amazon Web Services [27], Microsoft Azure [29], and Face++ [143] as test engines. As
shown in Figure 5.4, all the cases show that after the protection is applied to the original
image, the output confidence scores of the 2 images belonging to the same person drop to
a lower level significantly. The difference of amplitude of the decrease in the output scores
might attribute to the face recognition model architectures the service providers utilize.
The experiment outcome shows that the pattern of adversarial examples of face image
data against face recognition models can be learned by GAN models. The GAN-structured
model learns the transformation process that maps a data sample from the distribution of
the original images to its corresponding point in the distribution of adversarial examples.
Also, the successful protection by FaceAdvGAN for different face recognition models illustrates that the protection scheme works universally on multiple popular face recognition
frameworks.
Additionally, very interestingly, the FaceAdvGAN-Lite model that has a much simpler
structure reaches a better protection performance and faster run speed. The result that
FaceAdvGAN-Lite model outperforms FaceAdvGAN-Residual model shows a possibility to
design a more suitable model for the adversarial example generation without excessive structure layout.
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Figure 5.4. Case Examples For Commercial Face Recognition APIs.

5.5

Conclusion
In this paper, we propose FaceAdvGAN, a GAN-structured identity privacy protection

model for image data. The FaceAdvGAN-Lite can lower the accuracy of some of the stateof-the-art face recognition models by over 20% while maintaining the quality of the original
image. The FaceAdvGAN-Lite runs at real-time speed as the result of the simple architecture
and operates in a complete black-box manner.
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Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we present the methodologies to provide privacy protection on
image data. For general images, we propose the PSO-based pivot pixel modification method
to hide the image information from state-of-art CNN-driven image classification models. The
proposed algorithm adds noise on critical pixels on the original image iteratively until the
information privacy is well protected from the target model.
Further, based on the funding from the previous work, that pixels are of different values
for noise-adding schemes on the image data, we propose the definition of Sensitivity Map and
the integrated Sensitivity Map Noise-Adding (SMNA) model. The proposed model focuses
on a more specific area of privacy that the model is designed and developed to protect the
identity information contained in images from face recognition models. The SMNA model
uses the proposed concept of Sensitivity Map, which is a matrix of the original image’s size
where each element evaluates the sensitivity of noise on the pixel to the final output from the
target face recognition model. The SMNA model has a Sensitivity Map Generating GAN
(SMGG) to generate predicted sensitivity maps for original images. Based on the predicted
sensitivity maps, the SMNA model finally adds inconspicuous noises on the original image
in real-time speed and black-box setting. Through extensive simulations and analysis, after
the modification, the difficulty of revealing a person’s identity from the original image by
verifying faces with other photos by the target model is significantly increased.
Lastly, we propose a new direction of research that will be accomplished for dissertation. To additionally provide better protection for identity information in face images, and
to overcome the limitation that the SMNA model has reduced protection performance on
face recognition models other than the target model, we need a more comprehensive and
universal identity information encryption strategy for users’ face image data. We propose
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the FaceAdvGAN to generate the noise masks based on the idea of adversarial examples. We
utilize an adversarial example dataset developed by state-of-art generalization methods using surrogate face recognition model. Then, we use a GAN-structured generator to produce
highly transferable adversarial examples for face images in a black-box manner and real-time
speed. Finally, we propose the integrated noise generation model that performs directly on
face image data and provide identity privacy protection for different current face recognition
models. Till now, all the works have been accomplished. Work i) and ii) are published
at ICIOT and ISCI, and the work iii) is finished and ready for submission to journals for
under-review processes.
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